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While there are several moments throughout his career when Ricoeur devotes attention to the 
problem of truth—for example, in History and Truth, his conception of manifestation in his biblical 
hermeneutics, and when discussing convictions and non-epistemological beliefs in Oneself as 
Another—a more unified theory is never formulated. This can be seen as a somewhat odd omission 
given the emphasis he places on a hermeneutical form of reasoning. What is a theory of reasoning 
without a theory of truth? The aim of this chapter is to construct a theory of truth from various texts 
that span Ricoeur’s career. I begin by situating Ricoeur between Heidegger’s notion of truth as 
disclosure and MacIntyre’s view that truth is monolithic. I examine how fragility acts as the founding 
concept for a Ricoeurian theory of truth, which I describe as a kind of “holistic fallibilism.” The core of 
his theory is ethically grounded as opposed to emphasizing ontological disclosure, consistency of 




truth, fallibilism, holism, belief, unity 
 
 
The whole of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy can be seen as an endeavor to develop an understanding of 
different orders of truth in relation to a broad conception of the good life—whether in terms of self-
understanding, ethics, or politics. Symbolic meaning, narrative identity, non-epistemic belief, and 
mutuality are some of the significant ways in which Ricoeur seeks to understand truth according to 
dedicated fields of analysis while at the same time holding in view ontological questions of meaning. 
Hence, not semiotics, but semantics; not representation, but refiguration; not certainty, but 
confidence; not shared reasons, but mutual understanding. Integral to this ethical project is Ricoeur’s 
distinction between convictional and epistemic belief, which can be said to form the core of his 
account of how meaning in existence is grounded in relations with others and is therefore non-
reducible to scientific kinds of knowledge and verification. I address this topic elsewhere (Mei 2016). 
In this chapter, I want to accomplish something specific in relation to traditional philosophical 
expectations of what a theory of truth should comprise. What is referred to as a formal analysis of 
truth involves answering such questions as “what is truth?” and “what does it mean for a belief to be 
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true?” It would therefore seem commonsensical that for Ricoeur, who gave so much emphasis to the 
uniqueness and advantages of the hermeneutical form of reasoning, such an analysis would be an 
important area of investigation. However, he does not say much on this topic. 
 This chapter is an attempt to provide such an analysis of truth, at least in attenuated form. 
(Hence, my use of the term “constructing” in the title should be read as a philosophical project 
underway.) It proposes to construct Ricoeur’s theory of truth in terms of its ethical distinction against 
the backdrop of two of his contemporaries—Martin Heidegger and Alasdair MacIntyre—who offer 
more explicit accounts of truth and with whom Ricoeur has some affinities. As we will see, Ricoeur’s 
distinctiveness emerges in how he balances history and ethics in view of truth. To mark this distinction, 
I will argue that both Heidegger and MacIntyre over-determine an aspect of truth—respectively, the 
truth of being as disclosure (aletheia) and truth as one and as the terminus of inquiry. In either case, 
the over-determination of truth fails to account adequately for our being-with others, which is central 
to Ricoeur’s thought. 
In the first section, I provide a sketch of Ricoeur’s conception of truth, or how we can say he 
thinks truth in a broad sense. In the second and third sections, I attempt to elaborate this conception 
in terms of a theory of truth, or what is an analysis of truth employing analytical concepts. In particular 
I draw on the terms holism and fallibilism and attempt to interpret them in view of Ricoeur’s concern 
for ethical being, or what can be seeing as grafting his philosophical anthropology on epistemological 
concepts that have been stripped of their relation to lived experience with others.1 
 
Between Heidegger and MacIntyre, Ontology and Metaphysics 
To say Ricoeur is situated between Heidegger and MacIntyre is a way of saying that he offers an 
account of truth that attempts to hold in balance the significance of ontological meaning as disclosure 
(the truth or meaning of being) and the metaphysical unity of truth (truth as one). He does so by 
emphasizing the role and importance of the historical complexity through which truth plays out in a 
condition of human plurality. For Ricoeur, truth may be a substantial concept according to which we 
attempt to think philosophically, but this project of thought is distinct from how we can actually live 
in view of truth. So while truth has a conceptual priority, Ricoeur nonetheless grounds it in his analysis 
of the human condition. This grounding is most prevalent in his constant reference to human fragility, 
which is not just the liableness to err but an existentiale of vulnerability that transforms the manner 
                                                          
1 I should note that I take some liberty in ascribing the term “hermeneutical” to Ricoeur’s theory of truth. In 
drawing on earlier texts I am assuming that his discussion is consistent with his pre-hermeneutical thought (e.g., 
History and Truth), aspects of his biblical hermeneutics, and his ethical thought in Oneself as Another. This unified 
reading of Ricoeur may irritate the more historically-minded scholar, but it is a necessary interpretive gambit if 




in which we should see how claims to knowing and understanding operate (Ricoeur 1986: 1; 1992: 22, 
191–196). I will discuss fragility more thematically below. For the moment, I merely assume its general 
meaning. The upshot of this for Ricoeur is that the question of truth must be confronted and 
understood practically as it is experienced in the human condition of fragility. Furthermore, this 
condition is never overcome, especially not by a project aiming at certain, infallible knowledge. Rather, 
it must be affronted in a manner that yields the condition for attesting to one’s own sense of meaning 
and the meaning of others. In the end, truth is interrelational. 
 
a) Heidegger and truth as disclosure 
Heidegger’s discussion of truth as disclosure (aletheia), or unconcealment, gives priority to 
the manner in which entities make themselves accessible to human understanding and action. 
Although Being and Time is largely dedicated to showing how truth is in some sense dependent on 
human understanding, there is nonetheless a subtext in which human disclosure of a world is possible 
only because being itself gives itself. Consequently, this means that beings participate in this original 
force or power in the way they give us access to themsleves. This donative meaning is what makes 
disclosure an event that the human subject cannot surpass or attempt to control through episteme. 
Taken together, humans and beings comprise a relation in which an original ontological disclosure is 
open to further disclosure (Heidegger 1971; cf. Sheehan 2001).2 So it can be said that all human action 
and interaction is derivative of being’s original and constant act of giving itself. 
Furthermore, the human relation to disclosure is not one based on sight, despite what terms 
like disclosure and unconcealment may suggest. On the contrary, it is precisely the identification of 
reason with clear perception that Heidegger wants to call into question (Heidegger 1962: 57–58/34). 
Hence, he emphasizes the logos of phenomenology not as the sight of reason but as the letting be 
through interpretation. “To the things themselves” does not mean seeing more accurately or 
sufficiently but attuning to being so that it can be grasped according to its complexity and subtlety. It 
is sight, or the traditionally rendered lumen naturale, that presupposes a capacity of reason to sort 
out this complexity in order to understand what is. Against this historical prejudice, which of course 
Heidegger traces to Plato’s notion of the Idea, stands the thesis that Dasein’s disclosedness is 
predicated upon discourse (Heidegger 1962: 171–172/133)—or what is spoken. Indeed, what can be 
spoken is only so because Dasein has first listened to being. As Jacques Derrida reminds us, hearing 
not only opens Dasein to its ownmost potential-for-being, but it also constitutes the destructive 
                                                          
2 This comes out particularly in Heidegger’s “Origin of the Work of Art” when he identifies earth as primordial 
source, or phusis, and world as the human poietic activity set in strife against it. On this reading, the so-called 
Kehre in Heidegger’s thought does not refer to a shift of his thought in a non-anthropological direction but a 
turning within his thought that discloses features that were earlier concealed. 
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retrieval of the metaphysical tradition. It hears what metaphysics only construes in terms of (visual) 
presence (Derrida 1993: 164, 173, 179–180). So the most original or authentic mode of relation is the 
act of listening. Heidegger writes, 
 
Hearing is constitutive for discourse [. . . . ] Listening to . . . is Dasein’s existential way of Being-open as 
Being-with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is 
open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. (Heidegger 1962: 206/163) 
 
It is perhaps worth bearing in mind that although Being and Time is largely preoccupied with the 
human mode of being, and thus listening as it relates to one’s own projects, Heidegger never departs 
from an essentially pre-Socratic conception of logos as a fundamental and intrinsic feature of being 
itself. Gadamer would later characterize this as the “universality of the hermeneutical problem” 
(Gadamer 1976: 3–17; cf. 1989: 474–491; cf. Beaufret 2006: 82; Ricoeur 1974: 464–465). 
 Ricoeur sits very closely to this Heideggerian account of truth in recognizing the primacy of 
disclosure and in giving priority to the role of listening. Consider the following passages: 
 
[D]iscourse is established close to human experience and it is therefore in experiences more 
fundamental than any ontotheological articulation that I will seek the traits of a truth capable of being 
spoken of in terms of manifestation rather than verification, as well as the traits of a self-awareness 
wherein the subject would free himself of the arrogance of consciousness. (Ricoeur 1977: 20) 
 
And when agreeing with Heidegger that listening is existentially primary, Ricoeur notes the role of 
language: 
 
The logos signified not only the power which makes things manifest and gathers them together [. . . .] 
The power to gather things together by means of language does not originally belong to man as a 
speaking subject. (Ricoeur 1974: 464) 
 
Both disclosure and listening illuminate a fundamental condition of human existence that Heidegger 
and Ricoeur believe to have been missed by the history of philosophy. But, of course, for each the 
reasons for and extent to which what is missed differ. Hence, Ricoeur states that Heidegger “gives us 
no way to show in what sense historical understanding, properly speaking, is derived from this 
primordial understanding” of ontology (Ricoeur 1974: 10).3 In any event, the role of listening occupies 
                                                          
3 Purcell (2013: 146) reads Ricoeur’s criticism quite strongly as expressing a logical failure in Heidegger’s thought. 
Purcell thus sees the appeal to primordial ontology as having a logical obligation to discuss how this ontology 
“explains the posterior level” (146) of derivative practices. I do not see this type of accusation in Ricoeur’s 
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an important role not only in terms of marking a rupture with traditional accounts of truth in terms of 
metaphors of seeing, but also in terms of how the human observer is placed in and before being. The 
metaphor of sight, as Derrida (1974 and 1983) observes, tends to be colonized by notions of human 
mastery and dominance. For the metaphysical tradition, to see is to see in its entirety, perhaps from 
an Archimedean point; if not, then, from a position least affected by agent-relative determinations. 
Listening, in contrast, is a mode of engagement predicated on sensitivity and receptivity to others. 
This is readily apparent in Ricoeur’s reflections on the Book of Job when he comments that 
Job’s transformation comes only through the recognition of a fragility that no longer attempts to find 
protection or consolation but attends to what is prior to these reactions, an encounter with being by 
listening that results in “the love of creation [. . .] which depends on no external compensation” 
(Ricoeur 1974: 467). In its ethical role, listening can be said to have its privilege when Ricoeur discusses 
the role of conscience (Ricoeur 1992: 352). Not the sight of the face of the other, but its voice: “Here 
I stand!” (Ricoeur 1992: 336).4 In short, one can say that for Ricoeur the primordial act of listening is 
fulfilled only when it becomes a listening to being with and for others. This extension of the act is in 
one sense Ricoeur’s insistence on undertaking a necessary detour in order to recover ontology. Yet, it 
can also be taken more definitively to express a thesis on the relation to truth. This relation may be 
historical, as Heidegger insists, but what comprises this history of being is precisely the ethical relation 
to others.  
Let me draw attention to this point more boldly. It is not just that Ricoeur’s thought differs 
from Heidegger with regard to the way he sees ontology requiring an ethics (or a certain rendering of 
it). Rather, my suggestion is that Ricoeur sees truth as inextricably tied to ethical relations.5 Its analysis 
cannot simply reside at the formal or symbolic level (i.e., as he mentions above in terms of 
verification), but must take into account statements, propositions, and utterances as they occur in a 
specific historical situation between someone who is speaking to someone else about something. 
 The ethical dimension is thus never far, for instance, from how Ricoeur envisages the tasks of 
translation and historical analysis. The truth for each task is one whose telos is situated in view of 
communicating with others. (As we will see, this differs from MacIntyre’s notion of telos.) Translation 
is based on the model of linguistic hospitality while the historian aims at a “good subjectivity” 
responsible to the past and present (Ricoeur 2006: 23 and 1965: 30). Put more radically, one can say 
                                                          
criticism. Rather, it seems to me Ricoeur cites Heidegger’s failure or refusal to let ontology be translated, 
correlated, interpreted in the direction of specific practices and methods (cf. Ricoeur 2013: 70–71). Hence, 
Heidegger dissolves historical knowledge by his ontology. It is not that Heidegger failed to address a question of 
logical consistency, but that on his account this demand is a wrong one. Ricoeur (1986: 47–48) appears to offer 
a similar criticism of transcendental reflection. 
4 For a discussion of listening and conscience in relation to social conflict, see Mei (2016). 




that in the last analysis there is an identity between truth and ethics where for something to be true 
requires not just a logical articulation but an ethical one. Is this not implied when Ricoeur announces 
that “[c]ommunication is a structure of true knowledge” (Ricoeur 1965: 51)? And what is 
communication if not an event taking place with others and which has as its paragon a kind of 
community, a friendship. If this did not play an important role in Ricoeur’s thought, he would not 
venture to say that there is “[n]o truth without friendship.”6 
Should the proposed identity between ethics and truth in Ricoeur’s thought be any surprise? 
The ontological disclosure of truth leads to ethical concerns precisely because listening to being is 
itself never unmediated and is already an interpretation set alongside other interpretations by those 
who are also listening. This identity, nevertheless, is one that is only maintained through the detour 
of engaging with others such that ethics cannot be first philosophy in some unmediated sense. The 
call to be ethical does not come from outside oneself as an injunction à la Levinas, but in being-with 
others. That is to say, the call of being is never immediately one’s own, but a voice that one hears only 
in a world, a place, a situation with others (Ricoeur 1992: 351). In discourse, in debate, in attempting 
to understand others, the ethical perspective must be recognized and won through attending to 
specific features and dimensions of what is at stake. So the identity between truth and ethics does not 
cancel other modes of discourse or other forms of regional analysis but presupposes their presence 
and their involvement. Logic, for example, does not become obsolete since it comprises part of the 
manner in which things can be said and heard. Different methods and approaches may be involved in 
an analysis of truth, but the intentional relation to truth—or as Heidegger would say, our 
comportment towards the disclosure of being—is ethical by virtue of having an intention towards 
something that may clarify, translate, unify, incite action, and so on. To reiterate, this does not mean 
ethics is first philosophy, but rather an inevitable context in which truth plays out. 
Another way of understanding this ethical identity of truth is in the manner in which being can 
be said in many ways (Ricoeur 1992: 299). To speak truthfully about being requires negotiating those 
language games arising from different perspectives, orders, traditions, and disciplines. So the situation 
is already one that requires a duty of care in listening . . . “Starting from this fact of life, let us 
translate!” (Ricoeur 2006: 20). 
In contrast, the emphasis on listening in Heidegger falls on how to listen appropriately, to be 
ever situated with this question, to see the question itself as the response to being. That being can be 
                                                          
6 I assume Ricoeur (2004: 336) is speaking favourably of Henri Marrou’s philosophy of history. I describe 
friendship as a regulating ideal because the realization that one’s own existence can only occur in “living 
together” is a reflexive one confronted by several obstacles, not least of which are the ways in which friendship 
reduces to utility and pleasure; Ricoeur (1992: 186–187). Compare Ricoeur’s (2004: 384) intention to remain 
with the subject of the practice of the historian when thinking Heidegger’s notion of historicity. 
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said in many ways requires returning to the origin of being, or being understood as origin. It is not that 
Heidegger’s philosophy is un-ethical or a-ethical on this view. Rather, his conception of ethics, as 
arising from the questions of being and dwelling, drives towards a different notion of what it means 
to be ethical. Appropriateness to others presupposes an appropriateness to being.  
 Having said this, Heideggerians might allege that the ethical concern as Ricoeur articulates it 
is trivial. The argument, they might say, is one of recognizing what kind of ethics follows from ontology, 
and not presupposing what ethical being must look like. On this view, appropriate action is more 
accurately conceived as a kind of habitation (ethos) within being that can only come by way of listening 
to being itself. But this response only helps to mark what is at stake in a notion of truth. The stakes of 
a theory of truth come down to that on which our beliefs might have traction. According to my account 
of Heidegger, what is at stake is an appropriate relation to being, while for Ricoeur it is the prospective 
momentum by which truth draws one into more determinate and intimate relations with others.7 I 
am not sure this is an either/or situation, but one that requires, on the Ricoeurian view, constant 
mediation, or on the Heideggerian one, the recognition that it cannot be overcome. 
 
b) MacIntyre and truth as one 
With MacIntyre one finds a commensurate concern for ethical being as a capacity to co-exist with 
others. To do so means contending within the complexity of historical understanding that MacIntyre 
represents in terms of traditions and rivalries. At stake in these conflicts are reasoned accounts of 
practices in view of a telos of comprehension. This telos may not be actualizable, but it nonetheless 
exists insofar as every act of reasoning recognizes as its aim a terminus in which reasoning would 
ideally be complete or sufficient (MacIntyre 2006: 56–58, 156). As with the previous sub-section, I 
want to focus on what Ricoeur shares with his counterpart in order to distinguish how he differs. 
Both Ricoeur and MacIntyre express a commitment to understanding human existence in 
relation to the metaphysical principle of unity—that this individual and fragmented life can be 
understood and lived in relation to a meaningful whole. Both therefore understand unity in quite a 
substantive sense, and given their religious affiliations and commitments, this would seem no surprise. 
As early as their Bampton Lectures on religion and atheism from 1966 (MacIntyre and Ricoeur 1969), 
significant nuances can be detected with regard to their respective conceptions of unity, that is, what 
ontologically and metaphysically consists in unity and how we should attempt to live ethically in 
accord with it. It may be that these differences can be explained more superficially in terms of 
MacIntyre's Catholicism and Ricoeur's Reformed Protestantism, but I think these kinds of 
                                                          
7 Another way of seeing this difference between Heidegger and Ricoeur is in the latter’s development of the 
concept of attestation as a response to the former’s concept of anticipation. See Jean Greisch (2001: 379–385). 
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explanations, no matter how historically accurate, miss a very important point. Neither philosopher is 
reducible to their religious convictions. Rather, both hold philosophical views they find plausible and 
compelling for philosophical reasons even if other reasons may be involved. 
For MacIntyre, unity is a cosmological feature that endows everything occurring within the 
cosmos its distinction. Though not using the term unity, he does in fact describe the universe according 
to a pre-existing order. One of his key arguments with reference to a theory of truth and language is 
that truthful assertions are good not simply because they provide an accurate account of how things 
are—that is, true beliefs about a certain state of affairs. More importantly, argues MacIntyre, the good 
of truthful assertions enables one to think how things are in terms of why things are. In other words, 
the goal of inquiry is not simply to settle on a truthful account of how things are but to reach a 
terminus of understanding. This terminus is neither a conglomeration of truthful accounts, nor is it a 
goal simply because truthful assertions are utile for human existence. The “why” of inquiry strives 
towards achieving an understanding of “the place of the objects about which [the mind] judges in the 
overall order of things” (MacIntyre 2006: 207). Indeed, MacIntyre’s appeal to the overall order of 
things is substantive and should be taken in a strong sense of there being a complete and final 
coherence to reality that the mind ever-ceaselessly attempts to grasp: 
 
It is then a metaphysical presupposition of this view of truth that there is an order of things and this 
order exists independently of the human mind, just as do the objects and sets of objects that find their 
place within it. (MacIntyre 2006: 206) 
 
The cosmological implications of this metaphysical presupposition are perhaps most evident in his 
sympathetic portrayal of the ancient Greek conception of cosmic order and justice. He comments in 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?: 
 
For the use of the word ‘dike’ [ . . . ] presupposed that the universe had a single fundamental order, an 
order structuring both nature and society [ . . . . ] To be dikaios is to conduct one’s actions and affairs 
in accordance with this order. (MacIntyre 1988: 14) 
 
The metaphysical notion of order to which MacIntyre is philosophically committed involves an already 
established coherency with which the human mind seeks conformity, or what is the rational form of 
inquiry to which he often alludes. Consider, for example, his comment on first principles: 
 
Genuinely first principles, so I shall argue, can have a place only within a universe characterized in terms 
of certain determinate, fixed and unalterable ends, ends which provide a standard by reference to 
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which our individual purposes, desires, interests, and decisions can be evaluated as well or badly 
directed. (MacIntyre 2006: 146) 
 
In other words, truth, as the goal of inquiry, is one:  
 
To make any assertion whatsoever is to be committed to the judgment that that assertion is true—not 
true in this or that domain, not true for this or that group of human beings, but true. (MacIntyre 2009: 
67) 
 
Metaphysical unity determines how we should understand how truth is operative historically and 
socially. 
MacIntyre is, of course, very much aware of the historical efforts of humankind to attempt to 
achieve this conformity and the ways in which such attempts have gone and can go terribly wrong, 
both philosophically and politically. He is by no means a champion of a monological notion of reason 
(cf. Barry 1995: 119–124). 
 Nonetheless, if MacIntyre has an aversion to overly simple notions of objectivity and truth, it 
is difficult to see how he does not, at some fundamental level, believe that rational inquiry should be 
measured by the eternal standards of order, whatever they may be, which constitute the universe as 
it is. This is because such a strong commitment to truth resolves into the argument that there cannot 
be competing truths; in the end the final terminus is one truth. And what we may regard as distinct or 
even singular domains of reality and human existence are inadequate ways of conceiving forms of 
inquiry. MacIntyre argues that distinct domains of inquiry “are not self-enclosed, so that truths in any 
one domain have no implications for what is true or false in any of the others” (MacIntyre 2009: 68). 
However, this seemingly totalistic and totalizing representation of inquiry, while no doubt diminishing 
the relative viewpoints of different peoples, also entails a demand that existing traditions and 
institutions submit their own precepts, practices, and beliefs to the test of historically developing 
knowledge. MacIntyre’s conception of debate is forward-driven in the sense that he sees any claims 
to universality—whether they be moral claims or individual assertions of rights—presuppose a kind of 
test of universalization. Yet rather than the criteria for this test being known in advance, MacIntyre 
concedes that from our current historical standpoint we work our way towards the universal terminus 
by engaging with what appears historically as the most compelling reasons. Indeed, MacIntyre’s 
conception of rival traditions requires historical transformation through the philosophical and moral 
imagination. The progression towards truth, whilst not a final declaration that eliminates or 
marginalizes historical predecessors, is an on-going self-reflection from within a particular tradition. 
MacIntyre, of course, retrieves historical sources to articulate what is problematic about modernity, 
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and this articulation provides, in view of his conceptions of truth and order, the resources by which 
we can progress beyond philosophical parochialism. 
It would seem that MacIntyre’s forward-driven philosophical outlook would sit uneasily with 
Ricoeur. Consider, for example, Ricoeur’s criticisms of MacIntyre’s one-dimensional account of 
narrative understanding, which omits discussion of those types of particularities that problematize 
the notion of a narrative unity of life: the difference between fictional author/narrator and the one 
who authors and narrates one’s life; the distinct categorical difference between fiction and life with 
respect to beginnings and endings; and finally, the entanglement of other life histories and narratives 
in real life (Ricoeur 1992: 159–162). Nonetheless, one can see a similarity between the two 
philosophers. Ricoeur states, 
 
The unity of the world and the unity of man are too near and yet too distant: near as horizon which is 
never reached, distant as a figure seen through an infrangible pane of glass. (Ricoeur 1965: 195; cf. 176) 
 
The view of unity as a horizon is perhaps indicative of the kind of terminus to which MacIntyre alludes. 
Moreover, the unbreakable glass separating us from reaching this terminus can be understood, on 
MacIntyre’s view, as the historical process continually unfolding new modes of engagement and 
debate. There is also another respect that joins MacIntyre to Ricoeur, and this is the way Ricoeur sees 
the order inherent to the universe as the prerequisite for human understanding. Ricoeur thus sees the 
unity of the world correlative to the unity of humankind (Ricoeur 1965: 194–195). 
 This jointure between the overall coherence of the universe and human beings within the 
universe cannot be underestimated. As we saw with MacIntyre, it provides the metaphysical context 
in which truth extends beyond the private soul contemplating its internal reality. With respect to 
Ricoeur, this jointure provides the foundation upon which “the effort and desire to be” can be 
developed ethically, that is, the co-existence with others in the institutions we develop. Yet despite 
these similarities, there is no mistaking Ricoeur’s unwavering intention to characterize fragility over 
against unity: 
 
[W]e are incapable of coinciding with “the flux of existence which lays the ground for all attitudes.” 
First, this unique experience, which is my unique life, is never reflected in its lived simplicity; it is 
immediately perceived through the diverse cultural realizations which divide it. . . . Man’s unity is too 
primordial to be understood; but above all, our cultural life is torn by the rivalling passions which have 
created it and to which religion adds its own: theological rage, pharisaic bad faith, ecclesiastical 




The problem of fragility is perhaps most clearly articulated in its ethical context, thirty five years later, 
when Ricoeur discusses the ability of the self to relate to others—the “shattered cogito” fragmented 
by the passions as well as its own lack of certainty (Ricoeur 1992: 22). The question for Ricoeur is not 
how to overcome uncertainty—that is, how to find a necessary and sufficient foundation or process 
of reasoning. Rather, it is to understand the passions and fallible reason positively and productively. 
In other words, the project of certain knowing is as misled as it is impossible since it would result in a 
no-longer human existence. So when Ricoeur comments, 
 
Anyone who wished to escape this contingency of historical encounters and stand apart from the game 
in the name of a non-situated ‘objectivity’ would at most know everything, but understand nothing 
(Ricoeur 1967: 24), 
 
he is insisting on a difference between knowledge and understanding. If we are to follow his own 
caution expressed some thirteen years after the passage above (Ricoeur 1981), then we should be 
wary of maintaining the distinction between the two. In fact, the attempt to construct a theory of 
truth from Ricoeur’s thought requires conceiving knowledge as no longer wed to the ideal of a non-
situated objectivity as it is for traditional metaphysics and epistemology, but as a situated one—in 
history and with others. 
In a similar spirit to his response to the metaphysical rendering of theodicy, Ricoeur’s 
conception of truth can be said to divest itself of traditional representations. Truth may exist, it may 
be synonymous in some way with a metaphysical unity (Ricoeur 1965: 180), but this does not mean 
that it should be understood metaphysically. It is true that there is a distinctively Kantian dimension 
to this disposition with respect to the limits of human knowledge: “I cannot express, articulate, or 
enunciate this unity rationally, for there is no Logos within this unity” (Ricoeur 1965: 55). But unlike 
Kant, Ricoeur seeks to complicate the privileging of reason by thinking the relation to truth, not in 
terms of living in accordance with it, but from the ground up as it is situated within plurality.8 Not to 
rise above this plurality in order to reason, but to reason through and in it. He comments, “Within the 
context of the concrete life of a civilization, the spirit of truth is to respect the complexity of the various 
orders of truth; it is the recognition of plurality” (Ricoeur 1965: 189; cf. 165). The task of thinking truth 
begins by conserving our encounter with plurality and not by synthesizing it, or what Johann Michal 
refers to as Ricoeur’s “broken Hegelianism” (Michel 2015: 33–40). It is true that MacIntyre does not 
posit such a synthesis as the terminus of inquiry; however, the process of inquiry is itself governed by 
it in a strong metaphysical sense. The contrast with Ricoeur’s concern for fragility helps to see the 
                                                          
8 More recent revisions of Kant fall prey to this as well. See Mei (2014: 253 n. 48). 
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consequences of this governance. Truth may not be realizable, but it gives to each unique group a 
sense of authority that, on Ricoeur’s account, is potentially problematic, if not threatening. “The One 
is too distant a reward; it is an evil temptation” (Ricoeur 1965: 165). It inevitably culminates in the 
transformation of the wish for totality as a totalization. Perhaps this is why MacIntyre insists on the 
language of rivalry and Ricoeur on mediation.  
 
I want to conclude this section by stating succinctly what I believe to be Ricoeur’s conception of truth. 
While retaining the notion of disclosure from Heidegger, Ricoeur nonetheless sees disclosure as 
something that cannot be isolated as the originary truth of being. Thus, Ricoeur’s turn to ethics vis-a-
vis a solicitude for the other is not simply a choice to pursue a different direction from the ontology 
proposed by Heidegger. When conceiving this turn within the general territory of an analysis of truth, 
it becomes a definitive statement about the nature of truth. Its historical disclosure cannot be 
disentangled from our ethical relations with others. With regard to MacIntyre’s attempt to 
accommodate plurality according to the unity of truth, I argued that while Ricoeur endorses a 
conception of unity, in the end he would be unhappy with MacIntyre’s notion of “truth as one,” which 
inevitably distorts the relation to truth because it reinserts a metaphysical dominance under the sign 
of a terminus of inquiry. From Ricoeur’s perspective, truth as one acts as a “fault” according to which 
“the wish of reason” for unity is a “first violence” (Ricoeur 1965: 165). Truth is not won by laying claim 
to a terminus, no matter how sufficient an account might be. Rather, it is won only in and through an 
attempt at mutually understanding others with whom one persists in the effort to be. This shift not 
only emphasizes the importance of the plurality of beliefs but it also attempts to prevent the 
mediation of conflicts of meaning and interpretation from reducing to relativism. Ricoeur’s notion of 
fallibilism, as we will see, assumes truth is operative in how it guides discussion but requires to be 
worked out in situ according to specific criteria. 
 
Ricoeur’s Holistic Fallibilism 
Let us now turn from a conception of truth to its theory, or what involves a discreet analysis of 
Ricoeur’s concept that might yield an argument about what it means for a belief to be true. To recall 
from the last section, the consequence of this analysis is not just local to a theory of beliefs, 
propositions, and language. Rather, what is at stake in determining what it means for a belief to be 
true bears directly on how we might conceive human understanding as participating in the world and 
being-with others. 
 
a) holism and fallibilism 
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Holism and fallibilism are terms typically employed in epistemology when discussing theories 
of truth and justification. A holistic conception of truth refers to the idea that no single belief makes 
sense on its own and that it must be viewed within its larger systematic structure. Holism therefore 
maintains that truth cannot be the property of individual beliefs but rather beliefs as they cohere 
within a system. For example, H. H. Joachim argues that “Truth in its essential nature is that systematic 
coherence which is the character of a significant whole” (Joachim 1999: 50, §26). The strength of 
holism I want to emphasize here, and which I will modify when discussing Ricoeur’s holism, is the 
thesis that meaning is a phenomenon belonging to a general structure, or significant whole. Holism 
therefore conceives truth in some ideal, universal sense (i.e., Truth) that cannot be entirely realized 
by finite human knowledge (Joachim 1999: 52, §27). So when Willard Quine (1951: 39) concludes that 
“the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science,” he is attesting to truth as embodied in the 
general system of scientific knowledge, yet only incompletely since scientific knowledge is ever-
developing. Having said that, it is important to note that there is no agreement amongst holists about 
what general structure is the most complete or indeed what might constitute a hierarchy of individual 
structures within the general one.9 
 Fallibilism is the thesis that human knowledge is by its nature incomplete. So one may be able 
to provide justification for a belief, but this justification can never be absolute or final. Fallibilism can 
thus be seen as a counter-argument to rationalist claims to certainty, as for example in Descartes’ 
reference to clear and distinct perception by which one has “true and certain knowledge” (Descartes 
1996: 48). A stronger version of fallibilism argues that certain knowledge is impossible given the 
limitation of the human mind so that even a type of research programme that progresses historically 
by improving on aspects of a current body of knowledge will always represent a finite understanding. 
Paul Feyerabend argues, for example, that the natural sciences are by no means complete or unified, 
that scientific methodologies are themselves finitely determined and progress in science requires 
counter-inductive hypotheses (Feyerabend 1993: 9–23). The appeal of fallibilism is its de-centering of 
the human mind as the master of meaning and reality, something that fits well with the general 
poststructural suspicion of the Enlightenment representation of “Man the subject.” What is less 
appealing is the inherent pessimism about human knowledge. How can fallible existence not reduce 
                                                          
9 There is also a holistic theory of justification accounting for the criteria according to which one can say one is 
justified in believing a proposition to be true. In speaking about Ricoeur’s conception of truth, as we shall see, it 
is more accurate to describe him as a fallibilist since he does require the criteria of consistency and connection 
within a set of beliefs. Indeed, for him to do so would mean contradicting his view that discourse is polyvalent 
and situational. Holistic justification, in attempting to strive for overall consistency, has to fix the meaning of 
beliefs in order to maintain epistemic equilibrium. If one belief in the set has multiple meanings or is situation-
dependent, its cohesion would breakdown. 
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to a futile one? Ricoeur’s emphasis on fallibility shares some aspects with fallibilism, though it is 
modified according to his anthropology. 
 
b) Ricoeur, holism, and fallibility 
Let us therefore distinguish Ricoeur’s theory of truth in relation to the typical meanings of 
holism and fallibilism. We have seen in the discussion of MacIntyre that Ricoeur acknowledges the 
role of unity as a metaphysical principle yet in a limited, or to borrow Michel’s term, “broken” sense. 
Metaphysics occupies a role that is more consistent with an initial optative yearning rather than a first 
philosophy. Or as Ricoeur says, unity is “indispensable” for thought but “entirely ‘formal’” (Ricoeur 
1965: 192). Another way of describing its indispensability is to say that it is the presupposition of all 
thought that attempts to understand in order to live. Thus, holism in Ricoeur’s thought can be seen as 
the recognition of an ordered universe that is necessarily presupposed by our understanding: “This 
totality, therefore, must be given in some way prior to philosophy” (Ricoeur 1986: 4). He speaks of 
various forms of discourse as attesting to and expressing this whole, especially in myth, and as 
enabling reflection because it takes the whole as something towards which discreet analyses must 
move. However, Ricoeur by no means sees unity as the aim that philosophical investigation must 
clarify and achieve. That is to say, per above, unity is entirely formal. It is formal because it prompts 
the occasion of philosophy (from our perspective of being in discordance with it) but not its ends. Its 
deliberate pursuit, Ricoeur comments, often results in closed systematic structures that often become 
totalizing: “All too quickly it has been said: It [unity] is there, it is Mind, it is Nature, it is History” 
(Ricoeur 1986: 48–49). 
 Ricoeur’s holism can therefore be construed in terms of a significant whole, as opposed to a 
general structure or system. The latter is indicative of a closed totality in which individuality and 
modification is merely a reiteration of some other aspect of the whole and thereby subsumed to it. 
Ricoeur’s criticism of semiotics and Hegelian dialectic can be seen as resisting closed systems. 
Semiotics views the meaning of signs in terms of relations to other signs and thus does not allow for 
the predication of new meaning in discourse as with metaphor (Ricoeur 1978: 66–76). Hegel’s 
characterization of reason and the actualization of Spirit involve a totalization of social and political 
being in relation to ideas of which we can no longer be certain. The closed nature of the Hegelian 
system is one in which its cunning presupposes those ideas which seem self-evident for actualization 
(Ricoeur 1988: 205). 
 Having said this, the term “significant whole” should be understood in two ways. First, per 
above it is formal in the sense of being signified in order to recognize it as enabling reflection. Ricoeur 
refers to this in general in terms of the role of signification as allowing for critical reflection (Ricoeur 
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1981: 117). Second, its formality emphasizes the human relation to it as incomplete. Thus enters 
fallibilism. 
 Ricoeur’s notion of fallibility fills out the incompleteness of the metaphysical formal unity. By 
this I mean, the formal unity is incomplete because it disregards how the truth claims we make are 
bound up with a kind of being that is inextricably with others. So while fallibilism may be a thesis about 
the limitations of human knowing, it also provides a way of productively engaging with this limitation 
by placing the locus of truth on agreement with others (even if this may be impossible in many 
circumstances) as opposed to some objective standard or set of criteria (which are impossible to 
establish). This rendering of agreement does not necessarily involve the criticism that what one holds 
to be true may not correspond to the way the world really is.10 This is because the belief in an objective 
world external to our perception is itself the product of a formal notion of unity. (Hence, why we see 
below the way scientific methodology can become imperialistic and distortive.) This external world 
may indeed exist in one sense, but to assert so from the human perspective is to introduce the human 
mode of understanding and interpretation as part of this external world. There is not just nature, but 
humans within nature, producing and reproducing according to their actions and systems of thought. 
To reiterate, the upshot of this view is that an analysis of truth falls on the interrelation between those 
beings making assertions about what is true. It prohibits a sense that reflection can be entirely 
coincident with this whole as in claims to absolute and certain knowledge. Our fallibility thus plays a 
crucial, active role in how truth is worked out, or what Ricoeur calls the task of approximation, and 
which together is captured for him by the symbol of the tower of Babel (Ricoeur 1986: 49 and 2004: 
12, respectively). 
 
Being-true: What It Means for a Belief to Be True 
The stakes of Ricoeur’s account of truth in view of the human condition are now becoming clear. 
Because Ricoeur revises Heidegger's disclosure thesis by including being-with others, disclosure is no 
longer purely ontological but a being-with others. It is in this sense other-dependent, and the eventual 
nature of truth (Ereignis) then becomes one that cannot be analyzed at the level of individual 
statements abstracted from this fundamental relation. One can say Ricoeur's holism is a significant 
whole comprised primarily by being-with others. What is distinctive about this turn is that unlike a 
narrow epistemological approach that seeks a corrective to fallible judgments, Ricoeur’s approach 
examines the conditions in which we attempt to utter beliefs. It is precisely these conditions that 
determine how truth is instantiated in our statements about reality. In other words, traditional 
epistemological approaches assume that not only can the predicate “is true” apply to statements 
                                                          
10 Or what is a common criticism of coherentism; Almeder (1986: 213). 
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abstracted from historical and existential conditions, but moreover, that a judgment about its 
applicability can be determined by criteria valid for any of these conditions (truth is one). To be sure, 
Ricoeur’s notion of attestation figures centrally in how meaning assumes a specific assertional form 
as an expression of confidence (belief-in) in one’s capacity to act. I address this the role of attestation 
elsewhere (Mei 2016), and in this section I want to examine the manner in which attestation is 
involved in what it means for a belief to be true. 
From what I have said above, claims to truth are indexed in a double sense. First, to the 
situational event in which a speaker attests in a belief. Second, to the personal and collective 
experience shaped by a historical culture. This second sense involves not only the experience of the 
speaker but the culture and historical forum the speaker faces. The two are not always the same. To 
describe this type of indexing of beliefs, Ricoeur refers to the notion of “being-true” (Ricoeur 1992: 
299), which is meant to capture the complexity and plurivocity of the ontological and historical 
dimensions of existence. The ontological involves the manner in which, following Aristotle, being can 
be said in many ways. The historical, as indicated above, describes the specific cultural heritage in 
which being is said. Ricoeur is not just recognizing cultural pluralism but attempting to work out how 
pluralism can be held accountable to truth without reducing to one account of it. 
What does it then mean for a belief to be true?11 
For something to be true on Ricoeur’s account means that the person uttering the belief has 
some stake in the belief and how it applies to a situation in which the utterer may act. The locus of 
this “definition” is in the application of a belief by the utterer. Or, the truth of a belief is relative to its 
application to a situation by the person uttering the belief. I want to elaborate this in terms of four 
features: agency, commitment, application, and capability.   
Agency. Let us note that the focus turns from what the belief should do (correspond, cohere, 
achieve an end or operational value) to what the person uttering the belief is considering in terms of 
an action. On Ricoeur’s account, the foregrounding of the role of the person is consistent with 
expanding the philosophical analysis of statements beyond the philosophy of language. This is because 
in typical analyses of statements, the subject (human) is understood to be transparent, with the status 
of the statement or belief as that which is truly opaque. Ricoeur’s turn towards the opacity of the 
utterer is not just one of complicating the philosophy of language with a further obstacle but of 
switching the direction of analysis altogether. This is evident when the argument in Oneself as Another 
                                                          
11 I therefore do not attempt to account for how we can determine beliefs to be true, which involves a theory 
of justification. Rather, I will explain what it means for a belief to be true according to Ricoeur’s theory. The 
difference in tasks can be seen in how the correspondence theory of truth holds that for a belief to be true a 
statement must correspond to a state of affairs. Yet, to talk about how one determines whether a statement 
does indeed correspond involves a distinct process of justification. See note 14 below. 
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moves from the complication of the “I” who utters to a more substantial thesis about the speaking 
subject who is constituted by a personal, narrative identity (Cf. Ricoeur 1992: 44–45 and 113–114). 
Why this shift? Because without personal identity, which involves a narrative grasp of one’s life, the 
utterance examined by the philosophy of language has no existential application. It does not actually 
relate to a real situation. Hence, the subject who speaks is really the agent who intends to act in 
relation to a situation. Thus, statements are both locutionary and illocutionary insofar as the latter 
aims to achieve some end by virtue of saying it. Simply put, statements involve practices (On Searle 
and Austin, see Ricoeur 1992: 154–155 and 1981: 168, 199 and 205). 
Commitment. For the utterer to have some stake in the truth of the belief is to say that he or 
she has some commitment. Generally speaking, beliefs involve a commitment because statements are 
interlocutionary and illocutionary. With respect to interlocution, the “I” of statement is, on Ricoeur’s 
account, “bipolar” since 
 
it implies simultaneously an ‘I’: that speaks and a ‘you’ to whom the former addresses itself. “I affirm 
that” equals “I declare to you that”; “I promise that” equals “I promise you that.” (Ricoeur 1992: 43–
44). 
 
Another way of thinking of the substantial nature of interlocution is in terms of attestation, where to 
speak to another person is to attest to what you believe, and therefore will do, in relation to him or 
her. In addition to interlocution, the illocutionary force of beliefs, in which one does by and through 
saying, therefore assumes a degree of commitment in which one designates oneself as an agent 
undertaking what is deemed necessary or appropriate. It is true that not all beliefs will require action 
of an ethical nature. But the supposition here is that the fact that a belief is uttered is because the 
agent intends the utterance to affirm what he or she may do. On this view, what then can be said 
about typical statements of analysis—e.g. “The cat is on the mat”? Such beliefs are trivial but not 
irrelevant, and they are so because the degree of commitment to the belief has trivial aims or 
implications. 
Application. Truth (i.e., “is true”) is not a predicate describing the belief but a way of describing 
the application of the belief by the utterer. Hence, if beliefs involve some kind of commitment about 
how to act and why, their truth resides in the relation joining utterer to the situation and to those to 
whom he or she is speaking. Application is therefore a mode of truth, or the being-true, of a belief as 
it is enacted. To make a promise to someone involves an action of keeping the promise at some 
moment or throughout some duration. The enacting of the promise can be said to be an application 
of what one believes to be true in its respective context and not necessarily in any other. 
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Capability. It is clear from the committed and illocutionary nature of beliefs that they enable 
an agent to act. Beliefs therefore have an attestational quality that lends to the agent a sense of 
capacity, or power, to do. Ricoeur refers to this as “an ontology of act and of power” in which power 
expresses “the power-to-act of an agent to whom an action is ascribed or imputed” (Ricoeur 1992: 
303).12 Acting presupposes a form of self-reflexivity in which the end of the action is brought to the 
attention of the agent. Beliefs, in this sense, allow one to attest to what is relevant to do in a situation 
in relation to others as well as see oneself as responsible, or imputable, for these beliefs.13 
 
Conclusion 
In attempting to construct a theory of truth from Ricoeur’s philosophy, I have drawn on what I see to 
be two decisive features consistent throughout his career, or what I have termed the holisitic and 
fallibilistic elements of his thought. The holism consists of a formal unity that is made complete only 
when accounting for our fallibilistic relation with others. Hence, the analysis of truth should not 
privilege an abstracted representation of beliefs that omits the specific situational and historical 
context in which the belief is uttered by a person in view of an action in relation to others. At the cost 
of over-determining the ethical thought of Ricoeur, I concluded that this means being-with others 
becomes the overall context in which the truth of a belief can be grasped. Truth is in some sense an 
event of the relation with others. The merit of Ricoeur’s theory of truth is that it broadens the space 
in which we recognize beliefs occurring. It may complicate the analysis of beliefs because it introduces 
more variables, yet its richness lies in recognizing the more extensive manner in which statements 
about things involve much more intimate conditions when we make claims to truth. Accordingly, 
propositions and judgments expressed in linguistic form no longer serve as the privileged means of 
analysis as it does for much epistemology. An analysis of truth, it can be said, remains more in the 
event of the interrelation of speaking subjects as opposed to applying criteria in order to determine 
the reasonableness of their statements. To be sure, I have not attempted to discuss the details by 
which a process of validating beliefs in a Ricoeurian fashion might operate. But let me note in closing 
that such a process would involve reconceiving how justification draws on historically and ethically 
formed convictions about what it means to be with others. In this sense, it is not enough merely to 
                                                          
12 He also mentions the power-in-common of historical communities. 
13 Perhaps a distinction needs to be raised between what I have offered as Ricoeur’s theory of truth and 
pragmatic accounts since both focus on how an agent achieves an end by way of beliefs. I omit discussion of this 
due to the scope of this chapter. However, generally it can be remarked that Ricoeur places greater weight on 
the ethical nature of ends and beliefs and as well the substantive (as opposed to pragmatic) nature of discourse. 
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